Abstract
Introduction
Das, Saxena, and Gulati [7] proposed a dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme in 2004. Unlike other authentication schemes, the server has no need to store verification table. Also both user and server end require less computing resources because the scheme is based on one-way hash functions. However, researchers in cryptography found that the scheme failed to provide mutual authentication on the user end or server end. The security loopholes are unable to resist attacks from forgery servers, and the attackers are able to pass the authentication process without passwords [2-3, 6, 10, 12-16, 18, 20] . As a result, Wang et al. [17] proposed another dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme, which solves the above security loopholes, and allows mutual authentication at the user end and server end. Wang et al.'s scheme yields improved security and confidentiality, compared to the former scheme.
However, certain security issues persist in the improved scheme. This study reviews the above schemes and proves that Wang et al.'s scheme does not provide the property of login privacy [5, 8] and cannot resist user impersonation attacks and password guessing attacks. The property of login privacy in the scheme of remote user authentication is similar to the attribute of initiator privacy [1, 4, 9] in the key agreement protocol. In order to login remote server, the user must send login information to the authentication server. Usually the login information contains user's identity and is transmitted through an open channel. The requirement of login privacy prevents user's identity from disclosing.
To remedy the weaknesses discussed in the above, the study proposes a new remote user authentication scheme. The scheme uses symmetric encryption function and one-way hash function to provide login privacy and reduce the expenditure of computation. Also, the security and practicality of the proposed scheme are analyzed.
Review Wang et al.'s scheme
Wang et al.'s scheme comprises four phases: registration, login, verification, and password change. First, this section introduces the symbols in Wang et al.'s scheme (see Table 1 ). Next, each stage is introduced in details.
Registration phase
In the registration phase, the user U i transmits his/her identity ID i to the remote server S. After receiving the user information, the remote server S selects a password pw i for the user, computes the quantity N i = h(pw i ) ⊕ h(x) ⊕ ID i , and stores secret information {N i , y} and public hash function h(⋅) in a smart card. Finally, the remote server transfers the user password and smart card to the user through a secure channel. If user U i wants to login onto the remote server S, the first step would be to insert the smart card into the card reader and input identity ID i and password pw i . Next, the user end computes the quantity
, and sends the login information {ID i , CID i , N i , T} to the remote server S, where T indicates the current time stamp.
Verification phase
Upon receiving the user's login information {ID i , CID i , N i , T}, the remote sever S picks up the current time stamp T' and checks if T' -T ≤ ΔT, to verify whether the login information had been sent within a legitimate time frame. If it had exceeded the legitimate time span ΔT, the login request would be denied; otherwise, the remote sever S would compute the quantities h'
, to test whether the computed ID' i equals the received ID i . If not, the remote server S would reject the user's login request; if yes, the remote server S would compute a' = h(h'(pw i ) ⊕ y ⊕ T') and send the message {a', T' } back to the user U i .
After receiving the message {a', T' } from the remote server, the user end acquires the current time stamp T'' and checks if T'' -T' ≤ ΔT, in order to determine whether the message had been within the legitimate time frame. If not, the verification would be denied. Next, user end computes the quantity a = h(h(pw i ) ⊕ y ⊕ T') to see if it equals the received a'. If yes, the remote server would be deemed legitimate and the mutual authentication would be complete.
Password change
In this scheme, the remote server needs not to store user passwords or password relevant information. As a result, when the user wants to change his/her password, the remote server would not be involved. In the password change phase, the user inserts the smart card into the card reader and inputs the original password pw i and the new password pw new . Then the new secret quantity,
, would be computed, and the old one N i would be replaced by the new N i *. This completes the password change phase.
Security analysis
In this section, we pointed out the security loopholes in Wang et al.'s scheme. Their scheme does not provide the property of login privacy, and suffers from user impersonation attack and password guessing attacks. The details are as follows.
Violations to the login privacy property
Das et al. adopted dynamic ID to provide the property of login privacy. However, in Wang et al.'s scheme, the login information {ID i , CID i , N i , T} includes ID i , which is the user's identity and thus violates the login privacy property.
User impersonation attack
In the verification phase, the remote server verifies the login information {ID i , CID i , N i , T} to check whether the information was constructed by a legitimate user. Since both N i and CID i are results of the exclusive ID i , the remote server's verification was obviously ineffective. Details of the procedure are shown below:
Assume the attacker has intercepted the login information {ID i , CID i , N i , T} and altered it as {ID i *, CID i , N i , T}, the following would be the server's verification process:
⊕ ID i * = ID i * As a result, the altered login request passed server's verification, and the attacker was successful impersonating the user. Thus the login information {ID i , CID i , N i , T} is independent of user's identity. The loophole in the scheme is that it cannot withstand impersonation attack.
Password guessing attack
In the login phase, while the user is transmitting login information, the attacker is able to intercept login information and guesses the user's password. If the attacker registered as user U i on the remote server, then the server provided him/her {ID i , N i , pw i } information. When another user U j logs in, the attacker could easily obtain the login information {ID j , CID j , N j , T}. As a result, the attacker can guess user U j 's password through the intercepted information. Details of the process are as follows:
Given
Based on the computed value h(pw j ), the attacker U i is able to start a password guessing attack and obtain U j 's password pw j . This shows a loophole in the scheme, which was unable to resist password guessing attacks.
Our improved scheme
In this section, we propose a new scheme to improve weaknesses in Wang et al.'s scheme. The new scheme comprises four parts: the registration phase, login phase, verification phase, and password change phase. We introduce symbol definitions, follows by details of the processes in each phase. The definition of symbols is shown in Table 2 . Table 2 . Symbol definition for the improved scheme U i
The user pw i The password of user
ID i
The identity of user S The remote server
h(⋅)
One-way hash function ⊕ Exclusive operators
Server's secret parameter stored in the smart card
Registration phase
In the registration phase, user U i selects the password pw i and computes the value h(pw i ). Then user U i sends the registration information ID i and h(pw i ) to the remote server S. After receiving the user's registration information, the remote server S applies the secret key x to calculate quantities A = E x (ID i ) and B = h(pw i ) ⊕ h(x, ID i ). Finally, information such as {A, B, E(⋅), h(⋅), y} was stored on the smart card, and the registered smart card would be sent back to the user. The above actions went through the security channels. The registration phase is shown in Fig. 1. 
Login phase
In the login phase, user U i inserts the smart card into the card reader and inputs ID i and pw i . Then user end selects a random value r to calculate U = A ⊕ r and V = B ⊕ h(pw i ) ⊕ T c . Using the secret parameter y as encryption key, the plain text r and V are encrypted into cipher text W = E y (r, V). The login information {T c , U, W} is then sent to the remote server S, where T c indicates the current time stamp. After receiving the returned message {a, T s } from remote server S, user end acquires the current time stamp T and checks if T -T s ≤ ΔT. If the return message exceeds the legitimate time frame, then the verification would be denied. Next, user end computes a' = h(r, T s , y) and checks if a' is equal to a. If yes, then the remote server would be confirmed legitimate, and the mutual authentication would be complete. The login and verification phases are shown in Fig. 2. 
Password change
If user U i wants to change the password, he would insert the smart card into the card reader and replace the original password (pw i ) with a new password (pw new ); B* = B ⊕ h(pw i ) ⊕ h(pw new ) would be calculated, and the new B* would replace the original . This completes the password change.
Security analysis
This section presents security analysis. The proposed scheme not only preserves the advantages of Wang et al.'s scheme but also provides the property of login privacy. Therefore, prevents user from tracing information. The details are as follows.
Preserving login privacy
ID i , h(pw i ) A, B, E(⋅), h(⋅), y A = E x (ID i ) B = h(pw i ) ⊕ h(x, ID i )
User Server
User Server
In the login phase, the user ID is encrypted into cipher text and sends to the remote server. Since the attacker can not learn the user's secret parameter y or the password pw i , it would be unable to obtain the user ID. As a result, it satisfies the property of login privacy.
Untraceability
The proposed scheme not only preserves login privacy but also provides untraceability. Namely, the user's login information could not be traced. Because the newly-generated random variable r is included in the login information U and W, it conceals the user's information, such as A, B, h(pw i ), and ID i . As a result, it is difficult for the attacker to use collected login formation or trace specific users.
Password guessing attack
In the login phase, our scheme adopts symmetric encryption and decryption to protect the privacy of login information. The attacker could intercept the login information through an open channel, however, without the secret key x from the remote server, it would be unable to obtain the user ID, password, or relevant information. As a result, password guessing attack could not take place.
User impersonation attack
In the login phase, our scheme applies symmetric encryption to protect the user's ID and h(pw). The attacker does not know the secret key x on the remote server and would be unable to obtain or alter the login information, and would therefore be unable to conduct impersonation attacks on the remote server. As a result, our scheme effectively prevented impersonation attacks.
Replay attack
Under our scheme, all transmitted information would be time-stamped and checked whether such information had been sent within the allowed time. If not, the verification would be denied. As a result, our scheme resists replay attacks.
Performance analysis
Because the applications of registration and password change phases are less frequent, our analysis of performance focuses on the login and verification phases. In Table 3 , we compare Wang et al.'s and our proposed scheme. With respect to user computation, Wang et al. applies three hash functions, while the proposed scheme only uses two hash functions and one symmetric encryption. With respect to computation on the remote server, Wang et al.'s scheme requires three hash functions, and the proposed scheme uses two hash functions and two symmetric decryptions.
According to reports on smart card chips [11, 19] , the 512 bits secure Hash algorithm (SHA) requires about 67,000 clock cycles for data execution; the computation of AES encryption with encrypt key 128 bits requires about 11,000 clock cycles. Assume that the encoded bit lengths of variables are as follows: |A| = |B| = |r| = |V| = 160. Then, encrypting r and V, i.e. W = E y (r, V), requires three runs of AES or about 33,000 clock cycles. Similarly, decrypting W and (U ⊕ r′), i.e. D y (W) and D x (U ⊕ r′), requires 33,000 and 22,000 clock cycles respectively. As a result, our proposed scheme needs a lower demand on system resources (higher numerical efficiency), as compared to the scheme of Wang et al. 
Conclusion
In this study, we review Wang et al.'s scheme and prove that it does not provide the property of login privacy and is unable to resist impersonation and password guessing attacks. Therefore, we propose an improved scheme in which the advantage of mutual user and server authentication is permitted. In addition, the scheme preserves login privacy and the user's identity is not traceable. Our scheme resists password guessing, user impersonation, and replay attacks, and performs better in terms of numerical efficiency.
